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IN THE, SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PEARL GREGORY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.DENYER & RIO GRANDE WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
8695

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties will be referred to .as in the court below.
The plaintiff in her complaint claimed damages
against the defendant on account of serious injuries she
suffered in a crossing accident which occurred on the
26th day of December, 1955, when she was a passenger
in the front seat of an automobile driven by her husband.
She claimed the automobile came to a stop on the east
side of the crossing at Fourth North Street and about
Pourth West Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and after
having made such stop, proceeded west across the intersection and the railroad tracks at a slow rate of speed.
She claimed the defendant negligently drove the
railroad train against the automobile in which she was
Tiding, and the negligence complained of was:
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a. It had been the custom for flagmen to be stationed at the crossing, and that on this day, at the time
of the accident, there was no flagman on duty.
b. The defendant failed to give a signal by bell or
whistle or otherwise.
c. The defendant violated Section 5005 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, L tah, 1944, by operating its locomotive at a greater speed than 12 miles per
hour.
d. The crew of the train failed to keep a proper
lookout and failed to use reasonable care in the operation
of the train.
The plaintiff then set out serious IDJUries she suffered by reason of the accident (R. 1).
The defendant's pleading admitted the operation of
the train and that it had tracks which it used at the crossing wherein the plaintiff was injured. Defendant denied
all the other allegations of the complaint, and affinuatively claimed plaintiff's injuries were sustained solely
through her mn1 negligence or the negligence of her husband (R. 2).
There had been no pre-trials in tllis

ea~e,

and the

case caine on for jury trial before the Honorable Ray Van
Cott, Jr. The plaintiff introduced all her evidence and
rested. rrhe defendant put On llO

testinwny~

.and Inade

it~

two nwtions for a directed YPrdiet (R. 3 and 4). The
court granted the n1otions and entered its order that the
case be disn1issed with prejudice (R. 5 ).
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Thereafter, within the time provided by law, the
plaintiff filed her notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Y. Tipton, a licensed land engineering surveyor, identified the map, Exhibit P-1. This map was
drawn to scale, and depicts the railroad tracks crossing
Fourth North, and also the buildings in the vicinity, a
gravelled road, line of telephone poles, curbs and sidewalks, stop signs, etc. (R. 13-17). Mr. Tipton also testified he took two pictures, Exhibits P-2 and P-3. Exhibit
P-2 was taken from a point on the map, Exhibit P-1,
designated as No. 1 picture, and it is about half way
across the crossing and looking in a northwesterly direction. Exhibit P-3 was a picture taken by 1\:fr. Tipton
east of the crossing ,and looking west. The point where
the picture was taken was designated on the map, Exhibit
P-1, as No.2 picture (R.17-22) .
.Mr. Tipton said he could observe the track for approximately a quarter of a mile or a half mile, depending
on what the obstruction would be from point No.1, which
is illustrated by the picture, Exhibit P -2. Picture No. 1
was taken about in line with the watchman's house. If the
watchman were looking to the northwest he could see
about what would be shown in picture No.1, Exhibit P-2.
~Ir. Tjpton stated that at a point about 20 feet to the
west, where picture No. ~' Exhibit P-3, was taken, there
·would be no impairment of vision from any permanent,
fjxed object, and that point would be 190 feet east of the
east rail of the track where the accident occurred.
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Glen S. Cahoon and Curtis Coombs, police officers,
investigated the accident involved in this case. They
arrived there about 11 :54 a.m. There was a train on the
west track at the intersection with a diesel and 27 cars.
There w.as a damaged automobile south of the intersection
97 feet 7 inches from what the officers determined to be
the point of impact of the engine and the automobile (R.
32-33-50-52). Witness Cahoon marked Exhibit P-1 with
an "X" where they determined the point of impact. He
also marked on the map a point which he figured was
97 feet 7 inches south of point of impact. This mark represented where the Gregory automobile came to rest
after the accident. Exhibit P-8, a picture, is a view of the
right side of the Gregory car. P-9 is a front view of the
Gregory car. P-10 is another view of the right side of the
Gregory car. P-11 is another vie"w of the right side of the
Gregory car. P-12 (R. 35-36) is a view to the north of the
track on which the accident occurred. Officers Curtis and
Cahoon both testified there were box cars to the north
of the intersection (R. 44 and R. 65).
The plaintiff, Pearl Gregory, could not offer much
information as to the accident. She was 61 years of age
at that time and the wife of Marion Gregory·, the driver
of the automobile. On account of the grievous injuries
she sustained, she remembers nothing i1nmediately before
or after the accident, except she stated she did ren1ember
some box cars. Her hospital bills, not including the doctor
bills, amounted to $686.70. ~Irs. Gregory was unconscious for several days after the accident ( R. 73).
The plaintiff's only eye witness to the accident was
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her husband, :Marion vVilson Gregory, who died prior to
the trial. The first 27 pages of his deposition were read
into the record at the trial. On appeal, to save costs of
transcribing the deposition, it was included in the record.
Reference to pages will be referred to by "D-..... "
At the deposition, :Mr. Gregory was questioned by
the same attorney who handled the case at the trial court.
Marion W. Gregory w.as 71 years of age at the time
of the accident (R. 51). His eyesight and hearing were
good. He was a laborer. He came from Oklahoma and
Texas to Salt Lake City in 1944. He had seven living
children. The car involved in the accident belonged to
him .and was a 1940 Dodge 4-door sedan, properly inspected.
On December 26, 1955, at about 11 :20 a.m., he drove
to a filling station. The plaintiff was in the car on his
right side, and they intended visiting a son at Garfield.
It was a nice, clear, dry day- no snow (D-17). He drove
south to 4th North and turned right to the railroad crossing (D-8). l-Ie was acquainted with the crossing, had been
over it lots and lots of times, and had seen a watchman
there lots and lots of times (D-8 and 12). He knew where
the watchman's shanty was (D-11).
He .approached the crossing and stopped. He heard
noises, a motor running, no bells. There was no watchman
there to stop him (D-10, 11, 12 and 13). After Mr.
Gregory stopped and saw the road was clear, and assumed
he had the right of way on account of no watchman, he
started with the car in low gear (D-10). He figured because there was no flagman there to stop him, he had the
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right of way; that if there was a train corning, there
would have been a flagman there (D-13 and 14). He
noticed there were box cars setting on the tracks to the
north. He could not definitely tell just where the cars
were from the locomotive, but his judgment was two
or three tracks to the east and fifty y.ards to the north
(D-19 and 20). As they proceeded west across the tracks,
Mr. Gregory did not see the approaching train until he
was possibly on the track or within six or eight feet of the
track. His car was in second gear when he was struck.
The tr.ain sounded like a cyclone. There was no radio
going in his car - no conversation prior to the accident.
He figured his speed as very slow, but, as he said, it was
merely an estimation, or, as he said again, "guess work/'
for both him and the attorney (D-20 to 26).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The plaintiff makes the following assigmnent of
error:

I.
The court erred in granting defendant's motions for
directed verdict ( R. 3 to 5 inclusive).
ARGlT~IENT

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY,
AND THE COURT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.

There is only one assign1nent of error set forth and
'
it is upon that one point the plaintiff relies.
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The first motion offered by defendant (R. 3) had
two grounds :
1. That there was no evidence that the defendant
was guilty of any negligent act or omission.

2. That the uncontradicted evidence showed the
sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries was her own
negligence or the negligence of her husband, the driver
of the car.
In the second motion (R. 4), the defendant sets forth
four grounds for the motion for directed verdict:
1. That there was no evidence to prove that the
railroad was negligent.

2. There was no evidence that any negligence on the
part of the defendant w.as the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
3. The uncontradicted evidence was that the sole
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was the negligence
of the driver of the automobile.
4. The uncontradicted evidence was that plaintiff
'vas guilty of contributory negligence.
The order (R. 5) granted the motions of defendant.
The motions were pra.ctic.ally the same, and the court
in its order said they had been argued and fully considered (R. 5). The argument appears on about five lines
(R. 72). The court's full consideration of the matter falls
in one line wherein he says: "I believe the motion is well
taken" (R. 74).
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The evidence clearly shows that this intersection is
on 4th North, one of the busy streets of Salt Lake City,
and that it crosses either six or seven tracks (Exhibit 1).
The track upon which the train was running curved to the
northwest north of the intersection, as can be seen from
the picture, Exhibit 12, and the map, Exhibit 1. The
uncontradicted testimony of Marion Gregory, the driver
of the automobile, who is now deceased, shows that it
was customary to have a flagman there when trains were
about to cros.s the intersection. Mr. Gregory had gone
over that crossing, as he said, "lots and lots of times,"
and on that date his positive testimony was there was
no flagman. His testimony as to how he depended on
the watchman will be found in his depo.sition :

"Q. You told me you heard the sound of the
Diesel Engine as you came fron1 the east before
you got on the tracks¥
"A.

That is right.

"Q. Did that sound stop¥
"A. \Vell I wouldn't say it stopped, and I
wouldn't say it kept on because, for this reason,
just like me, you or anybody else. if you was to
drive down here to a crossing that you knew that
you was supposed to be stopped by a flagn1an, or
son1e sign like that to keep you from driving ontD
a track or anything: after there was none there,
I felt safe and I felt that the right-of-way was
1nine, which I have crossed that track before then,
when there was trains cmniug and stopped in 20
feet of that crossing there. And when there was
no flagman there to stop you and you had the
right-of-way and you knew you had the right-ofSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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way, you would feel safe in driving on too and that
is just what I did.

"Q. Well, Mr. Gregory, as I understand it
then you looked for the watchman, and when you
saw no watchman, and you saw the way ahead
of you clear, you figured you had the right-of-way~
"A.

I figured I was s.afe.

"Q. You figured you were safe, you had the
right-of-way, so you then proceeded on because of
there not being a watchman, you figured it was
clear.
"A.

That is right.

"Q. And you had no recollection of hearing
that Diesel Engine again after that~
"A. Well, not particularly. Just like any
other man. If you thought you was safe, and the
watchman was supposed to be there to take care
of a thing like that, you wouldn't expect it to run
across on you.

"Q. ·when you didn't see a watchman there,
you just relied on the fact the way was clear and
went ahead, is that right~
''A.

That is right." (D-13 and 1-t).

\Vhile the absence of a flagman will not absolve a
person approaching a railroad crossing from the duty
of exercising ordinary care for his own safety, however,
if a traveller knows that the crossing is protected by a
flagman and upon his approach observes that a flag1nan
is not there to give warning, the traveller may regard
that fact as some insurance to him that he can safely
proceed.
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Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 79 U. 439, 11 P
(2) 305, at page 309, says:

"and that when a traveler approaching a
crossing has an unobstructed view of the track for
a sufficient distance to see .and discover a train
in time to avoid colliding with it and advances
upon the intersection and is struck by the train,
a presumption arises that he did not look or if he
did look he did not heed what he saw and thus is
guilty of negligence, unless under circumstances
of exceptional cases u·here he is misled u·ithout his
fault by some act of the company. (Italics ours)
Clark v. Union Pac. R. Co., 70 Utah 29, 257 P.
1050."
Tanzi v. J..' ew York Ce,ntral Railroad Co. (Ohio Supreme Court, 1951) 98 K .E. 2d 39, 2-± ALR 2d 1151:

"Where a railroad does undertake to provide
a watchman to warn of the approach of all trains
at a crossing, it should reasonably anticipate the
effect of its having undertaken such an obligation.
If it does, it nwy readily anticipate injuries to
innocent parties due to a failure to giYe a custoInary warning which is reasonably expected by a
n1otorist. In effect, the railroad has so acted as
to induce others to act in reliance upon its action.
Even if such others are negligent as a 1natter of
law in so acting. the result of the action of the railroad nw~· be to put innocent third parties in peril.

"
"The rule generally recognized is that, notwithstanding that a railroad is under no dutY to
1naintain a flagman at a particular crossino- if it
ha8 customaril~· provided one to w~aru of tl;e approach of all trains to that crossing, then, at least
so far as persons who know of that customary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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practice are concerned, the failure of a watchman
to warn of an approaching train may constitute
negligence, even in an instance where the approach
of such train would not ordinarily involve .an unusual hazard to an approaching automobile... .''
The annotation following the above case at 24ALR2d
1161 discusses the absence of a customary flagman at a
railroad crossing.
Mr. Gregory, as he put it, had traveled over this 4th
X orth crossing lots and lots of times. He grew to depend
upon the watchman giving him a signal when a train was
.approaching, and the absence of the watchman in this
case was definitely negligence on the part of the railroad.
The railroad was also negligent in failing to keep a
proper lookout for the Gregory automobile crossing the
intersection. The railroad failed to sound a whistle or
ring .a bell to warn the Gregorys of their approach, and
this omission constituted negligence. Even if the testimony as to the lack of warning by bell or whistle is negative it is a question for the jury.

Hudson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., (Supreme
Court of Utah 1951), 120 Utah 245,233 Pacific
Jd 357.
The Gregory car was going at a slow r.ate of speed.
The railroad had an opportunity of observing it, and
should have blown a whistle, rung a bell or stopped the
train. The train did not come to a stop until 612 feet
beyond the point of impact. The snapshots, plaintiff's
Exhibits 8, 9, 10 and 11, show the terrific force with which
the diesel struck the Gregory car. These pictures also
show without question that this was not one of those cases
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where the front of the automobile struck the side of the
diesel, but this was a case where this car was struck by
the diesel and knocked and dragged 97 feet south on the
tr.ack.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 is a very good picture looking
north along the track from the cros_sing where the accident occurred. This exhibit demonstrates clearly that the
train would have to come around a bend at a point north
of the intersection, and it would be very difficult for a
traveller to see the approaching train until it was quite
close to the intersection. It also shows the difficulty that
a driver of a car would have in seeing the approaching
train should there be box cars to the north of the track,
which there were in this ca.se.
The court's ruling, perhaps, would have been correct
if Marion Gregory, the driver, were the plaintiff in the
action. He is not the plaintiff: Pearl Gregory, his wife,
is the plaintiff.
Bcnsou v. Deuz:er & Rio Graude R.R. Co., 4: r.

(~)

38, 286 P.(2) 790.
In this case it is unfortunate that she only had the
cold testimony of her husband in a deposition. It is unfortunate that on account of the severe injuries she sustained that she had no n1e1nory as to ·what occurred before
or after the wreck, and it n1ust be presmned, in the absence of contrar~- evidence, that she did everything necessary to protect herself.
Utah is con1mitted to the doctrine that a guest may
recover against a third person despite the contributory
negligence of a ho.st driver. In other words, the negliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gence of M.arion Gregory was not imputable to the plaintiff.
Hudson v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra;
Zenakis v. Garrett Freightlines, 1 U (2) 299, 265
P(2) 1007.
Assu1ning for the sake of argument but not conceding
as a fact, that Marion Gregory was negligent, if the
negligence of the railroad company w.as a contributing
factor, and contributed to the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, then the court was definitely wrong in its
rulings. Can this court say, or anyone say, from the evidence in this case that plaintiff's injuries were caused
solely by the negligence of M.arion Gregory~ The uncontradicted evidence shows there was no watchman,
shows that Marion Gregory had grown dependent upon
the watchman at that particular crossing, and that on this
morning when he saw there w.as no watchman there, and
he looked up and down and proceeded to cross, and as he
got on the railroad track, it sounded like a "cyclone," and
that is all he remembers.
A_ great deal was made by counsel for the railroad
company in examining the 71-year-old, uneducated
laborer from Oklahoma on pinning him to .a definite
speed. The old man said he w.as going slow, and there is
no question but that he was going slow, but whether that
slowness was -!, 6, 10 or 15 miles per hour, or even more,
is open to conjecture as Mr. Gregory said it was his estimation and his guess.
Defendant cannot point out in any way, shape or
form .any contributory negligence by Mrs. Gregory. She
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was grievously injured and had no memory of what occurred either before or after the accident. There is evidence of her severe head injuries, in this record for
only one purpose, to show that her statement that she had
no memory was not exaggerated. As the judge in the
lower court said, this directed verdict amounts to
nothing more than a non-suit (R. 75), and in granting
this directed verdict or non-suit, every presumption is in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant who
makes the motion.
Plaintiffs contend that in granting defendant's motion for .a directed verdict the trial court failed to give
due weight to the well-settled rule that a directed verdict
is not proper unless, after taking all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences
reasonably drawn therefron1, there is nothing upon which
a finding in favor of the plaintiff could be supported.
The jury could reasonably ha\e found that the negligence of defendant's watchn1an in failing to warn the
driver caused :1\{r. Gregory to proceed. The jury could
have reasonably inferred that if the watelnnan had warned
the driver, l\1r. Gregory, he would lun-e heeded and
stopped. The jur~- could lun-e found and could have
reasonably inferred that the negligence of the railroad
to warn :1\{r. Gregory b~- sounding a whistle or bell caused
t hr aceidPnt.
"It is wPll to keep in Inind ... that rig·hts and

dutie~ of a tra\·c·1er and of a railroad con~pan~- at
ero~s1ng~

are Inutual and reciprocal. The whole
duty is not cast upon either one or the other to
prevent collisions and injuries. The traveler may
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not carelessly and heedlessly attempt to pass on a
crossing on the .assumption that the railroad will
look out for him. Neither may a railroad company,
merely because it is the favored traffic, careles.sly and heedlessly operate its trains over crossings
at an unusual and excessive speed .and without giving adequate warnings, or create a misleading set
of circumstances and rely upon the assumption
that the traveling public may look out for their
s.afety and keep out of the way of the trains."
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah
37, 239 P(2) 163.
The railroad failed in its duty to the plaintiff and
even though the driver, ~ir. Gregory, was negligent, the
plaintiff's ease should have been submitted to the jury.
\Ye need not bolster with authority that rule of law that
determination of what is the proximate cause of an accident is essentially a jury question.

Valles v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Idaho) 238 P. (2)
115-l-.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff contends that the trial court acted arbitrarily in not allowing this case to go to the jury. There

was clearly a jury question presented to the court and the
negligence of the defendant could be predicated upon the
following:
(a)

Excessive speed.

(b)

Failure to keep lookout.
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(c)

Failure to give proper warning by whistle or

bell.
(d) Absence of customary flagman at railroad
crossing.
One or all of the negligent acts of the defendant were
the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff.
All of these points, except the speed, were supported
by uncontradicted evidence and the speed could be deduced from the exhibits.
The plaintiff respectfully asks that the trial court
grant the plaintiff a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY S. McCARTY and
LEE NEFF TAYLOR
.Attot·neys for Plaintiff and
Appellant

409 Boston Building
Sa~t Lake City 11, lTtah
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